@bilig/headlessProduction adoption starts before the first import. For a service runtime or agent tool, the package needs to be traceable to source, release CI, and a specific GitHub commit.
@bilig/headless is published with npm registry signatures and SLSA provenance
attestations. npm reports this for the latest published package:
npm view @bilig/headless@latest version dist.attestations dist.signatures --json
The important signal is that dist.attestations.provenance.predicateType is
https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 and that dist.signatures is non-empty.
From a clean project:
mkdir bilig-package-trust
cd bilig-package-trust
npm init -y
npm install @bilig/headless
npm audit signatures
Expected result for the current dependency tree:
audited 31 packages in 0s
31 packages have verified registry signatures
10 packages have verified attestations
Use this as a package-integrity check, not as an application-security claim. You still need workflow fixtures, rollback, and formula compatibility gates for your own WorkPaper-backed service.
Runtime packages are released by .github/workflows/headless-package.yml.
The workflow:
pnpm publish:runtime:check;main to agree before publishing;id-token: write for GitHub Actions OIDC;scripts/publish-runtime-package-set.ts with
npm publish ... --provenance.npm documents trusted publishing as an OIDC flow that avoids long-lived npm tokens and can automatically generate provenance for public packages published from public repositories:
OpenSSF Scorecard is another useful consumer-side signal for evaluating dependency risk:
This repository runs the official OpenSSF Scorecard action on every main
update and on a weekly schedule. Results are published to the public Scorecard
API, exposed through the README badge, and uploaded as SARIF to GitHub code
scanning so dependency evaluators can inspect repository posture separately
from npm package provenance.
The GitHub trust surface also includes CodeQL analysis for the JavaScript/TypeScript codebase and Dependabot version updates for npm, GitHub Actions, and the root Dockerfile. Those checks do not replace package provenance, but they make vulnerability discovery and dependency drift visible before a production adopter has to ask for it.
Package provenance does not prove that a workbook workflow is correct, complete, or safe for every production domain.
Before adopting @bilig/headless for customer-critical work, also run:
The package-trust question is: “Did this package come from the expected source and release path?” The production-readiness question is: “Does this exact workflow have fixtures, rollback, and compatibility evidence?”